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Abstract. We propose a deductive-verification approach for proving
partial-correctness and invariance properties on arbitrary transition sys-
tems, and demonstrate the approach on a security hypervisor model.
Regarding partial correctness, we generalise the recently-introduced for-
malism of Reachability Logic, currently used as a language-parametric
program logic, to arbitrary transition systems. We propose a sound and
relatively-complete proof system for the resulting logic. The soundness
of the proof system is formally established in the Coq proof assistant,
and the mechanised proof provides us with a generic Reachability-Logic
prover within Coq for transition-system specifications. The relative com-
pleteness of the proof system, although theoretical in nature, also has a
practical value, as it induces a proof strategy that is guaranteed to prove
all valid formulas on a given transition system. The strategy reduces
partial-correctness verification to invariant verification; for the latter we
propose an incremental technique in order to deal with the case-explosion
problem. All these various techniques were instrumental in enabling us to
deal with a nontrivial case study: proving that a Coq model of a security
hypervisor meets its expected requirements, expressed as invariants and
partial-correctness properties, within reasonable time and effort limits.
We also report on some experiments with a C+ARM assembly implemen-
tation of our hypervisor in order to confirm the fact that it introduces a
limited amount of execution-time overhead to operating-system calls.
1 Introduction
Partial-correctness and invariance properties are among the most important
properties of algorithmic programs. Partial correctness can be broadly stated
as: on all terminating executions, a given relation holds between a program’s
initial and final states; and invariants are state predicates that hold in all states
reachable from a given set of initial states. Such properties have been formalised
in several program logics and are at the heart of many program-verification tools.
In this paper we propose to generalise the verification of partial-correctness
and invariance properties, from programs, to arbitrary transition systems. The
motivation is that program verification, although desirable since it ensures a high
degree of trust in the verification’s results, is not always feasible. For example,
our case study in this paper: a security hypervisor for ARM machine code, was
implemented in a combination of C and ARM assembler; formally verifying the
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implementation would first require us to formally define the semantics of this
language combination: presumably, a huge task, with little potential for reuse.
How can one specify such properties on transition systems, and how can one
verify them? One possibility must be ruled out from the start: Hoare logics [1].
Although specifically designed to specify partial correctness and invariants, Hoare
logics intrinsically require programs, as their deduction rules focus on how instruc-
tions modify state predicates; and we do not target programs but more abstract
models - transition systems. It is worth noting that transition systems are a
well-known formalism, which can be used to specify broad classes of systems.
Regarding partial-correctness and invariance properties, one could express
them in temporal logic [2] and use a model checker to prove the resulting temporal-
logic formulas. However, model checkers are limited to essentially finite-state
systems (perhaps up to some state abstraction), a limitation we want to avoid.
Contribution. We thus propose a generic approach implemented in the Coq proof
assistant [3], whose expressive logic allows one to encode arbitrary transition
systems. We express partial-correctness properties by generalising Reachability
Logic [4–7, 9] (hereafter, RL) to arbitrary transition systems: RL, a language-
parametric program logic, is itself a generalisation of Hoare logics, designed to
loosen the syntactical dependency between a Hoare logic and the programming
language it is built upon. We also define Abstract Symbolic Execution (hereafter,
ASE), a generalisation of symbolic execution from programs to arbitrary transition
systems, and propose a deductive system for RL in this setting. We prove the
soundness of the proof system both on paper and in the Coq proof assistant.
The Coq soundness proof provides us with a Coq-certified RL proof system
for transition-system specifications. We also prove a relative-completeness result
for our proof system, which, although theoretical in nature, also has a practical
value, since it amounts to a strategy for applying the proof system, which does
succeed on all valid RL formulas on a given transition system. The strategy
reduces partial-correctness verification to invariant verification; for the latter we
employ a standard invariant-strengthening technique that amounts to strengthen
a state predicate until it becomes inductive, i.e., stable under the transition
relation. A known problem affecting invariant strengthening is case explosion: a
tentative invariant consisting of n conjuncts, to be proved stable over a transition
relation symbolically defined by m cases, generates n ∗m typically large goals to
prove, which can become overwhelming since both m and n are typically large
for nontrivial systems. The actual situation is even worse, since the conjuncts of
an inductive invariant are, typically, only discovered incrementally by users (by
analysing why a tentative invariant fails to be preserved by some transitions).
Moreover, when new conjuncts are added to a given tentative invariant, the user
has to re-attempt proving the stability of its whole set of conjuncts, new and old,
which can be, in our experience, a major source of frustration. We thus propose
a incremental technique to mitigate the need for such costly proof repetition.
All these techniques (proof system, strategy reducing partial correctness to
invariants, incremental invariant strengthening) were instrumental in enabling us
to verify a nontrivial case study with a reasonable amount of time and effort.
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The case study itself is a transition-system model of a security hypervisor for
ARM machine code that we designed [10]. The hypervisor alternates between a
simple static code analysis/instrumentation and dynamic code execution after the
analysis/instrumentation has deemed a given code section secure. It is designed
to minimise the execution-time overhead induced by time-costly alternations
between the analysis/instrumentation and execution phases. We formally prove
that the hypervisor fulfills its expected functional requirements: it hypervises all
“dangerous” instructions in any given piece of code while not semantically altering
the code in question. We also report on experiments with a C+ARM assembly
implementation of the hypervisor, which confirms the fact that hypervision
introduces little execution-time overhead when applied to operating-system calls.
Related Work. We give related work regarding Reachability Logic, symbolic
execution, formal verification in the Coq proof assistant, and security hypervisors.
Reachability Logic [4–7, 9] is a formalism initially designed for expressing the
operational semantics of programming languages and for specifying programs in
the languages in question. Languages whose operational semantics is specified
in (an implementation of) RL include those defined in the K framework [11],
e.g., Java and C. Once a language is formally defined in this manner, partial-
correctness properties of programs in the language can be formally specified using
RL formulas. The verification is then performed by means of a sound deductive
system, which is also complete relative to an oracle deciding certain first-order
theories. Recently, it has been noted that RL can be generalised to other classes
of systems, i.e., rewriting-logic specifications [12, 13]. In this paper we generalise
RL and its proof system to a broader class of specifications - transition systems.
One significant difference between the proposed proof system and earlier ones
is that our completeness result is not only a theoretical one but has practical
applications: it gives a strategy for applying the proof system’s rules that reduces
the verification of RL formulas to that of inductive predicates, for which a
systematic proof technique (the user strengthens a given predicate with new
conjuncts obtained by analysing why the predicate fails to be inductive) exists.
The papers [4–7, 9] describe several variants of RL (earlier known as matching
logic3). The version of RL that we are here generalising is the all-paths version,
which can deal with nondeterministic programs, in contrast with the one-path
version, limited to deterministic ones. We note that Coq soundness proofs have
also been achieved for proof systems of various versions of RL [6–8]. Those proofs
did not grow into practically usable RL interactive provers, however, because
the resulting Coq frameworks require too much work in order to be instantiated
even on the simplest programming languages4. By contrast, our ambition is
to obtain a practically usable, interactive certified RL prover within Coq, for
transition-system specifications and applicable to nontrivial case studies.
3 Matching logic now designates a logic for reasoning on program configurations [14].
These changes in terminology are a side effect of the field being relatively recent.
4 To our best understanding, obtaining certified RL interactive provers was not the
goal of our colleagues; rather, they implemented automatic, non-certified provers.
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Our approach is based on a generalisation of symbolic execution, an old
technique that consists in executing programs with symbolic values rather than
concrete ones [15]. Symbolic execution has more recently received renewed interest
due to its applications in program analysis, testing, and verification [16–21].
Symbolic execution-like techniques have also been developped for rewriting logic,
including rewriting modulo SMT [22] and narrowing-based analyses [23, 24].
Formal verification in Coq is a vast field; we here give some relevant references
regarding program verification as well as the verification of higher-level specifica-
tions. An early example of a significant system verified in Coq is a distributed
reference counter for, e.g., garbage collection, specified in an algorithmic style [25].
More recently, separation logic has been used to verify Coq implementations
of garbage collectors [26]. These two references illustrate a general trend that
goes from the early verifications of algorithms/specifications to the more recent
verifications of programs/implementations. Of course, verifying programs is a
desirable goal, but, as discussed earlier in this paper, it is not always feasible.
Major programming languages such as Java and C are the object of for-
malisations using Coq. We mention the Krakatoa [27] toolset for java, which
together with its counterpart Frama-C [28] for C are front-ends to the Why
tool [29], which generates proof obligations to be discharged in Coq (among other
back-end provers). In the area of C-related works in Coq an essential reference is
CompCert [30], a project that, however, does not aim at program verification but
at developing a trusted compilation chain for C. A Coq verifier for a low-level
extensible programming language is Bedrock [31], and a language-parametric
program-verification approach in Coq is presented in [35]. The current program-
verification and more generally programming language-related research in Coq
is active, as illustrated, e.g., by the Coq for Programming Languages workshop
series [32] affiliated with the conference POPL. This research is becoming in-
creasingly accessible to beginners thanks to freely available online books [33, 34].
Major international research projects around Coq, such as DeepSpec [36] aim at
specifying and verifying full functional correctness of software and hardware.
A hypervisor is for an operating system what an operating system is for a
process: it creates a virtual version of the underlying hardware. A guest operating
system running on top of such a hypervisor “believes” it is the only one operating
on the hardware, whereas in reality there can be several such guests. Virtualisation
ensures that guests are mutually isolated, and, as a consequence, it guarantees
the confidentiality and integrity of their respective data. It also ensures security
properties for the hypervisor itself and for the underlying hardware by preventing
any unauthorized access of guests to the hardware. Two kinds of virtualisation
can be distinguished: para-virtualisation and full virtualisation.
Para-virtualisation prevents privileged operations (e.g., updating memory-
management data structures) to be directly executed by guest operating systems,
by “wrapping” them into calls to hypervisor primitives. Thus, para-virtualisation
modifies the source code of its guests. It can be viewed as a collaboration between
guests and hypervisor. The Xen [37] hypervisor is an example of this category.
By contrast, full virtualisation does not require a guest’s code to be modified;
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rather, the hypervisor implements mechanisms to take back control when guests
execute privileged instructions. Guest operating systems are thus typically run
with a lower level of privilege; they trigger exceptions when attempting to run
privileged instructions, which are then handled by the hypervisor. VMWare [38]
and Qemu [39] are examples of this category. Our hypervisor [10], used as use
case study for this paper, is also based on of full virtualisation.
Finally, abstract interpretation [40] provides us with a useful terminology
(abstract and concrete states, abstract and concrete executions, etc) which we
found convenient for defining abstract symbolic execution, based on which our
proof system for RL is built and its soundness/completeness results are proved.
Paper Organisation. In Section 2 we introduce abstract symbolic execution, a
extension of symbolic execution from programs to arbitrary transition systems. In
Section 3 we generalise Reachability Logic to transition systems and introduce our
proof system, its soundness and completeness results, and the corresponding Coq
formalisation. Section 4 presents the Coq proof of soundness for the proof system
and the application of the resulting Coq RL prover to our hypervisor case study.
We also report on experiments with an implementation of the hypervisor, which
confirm the fact that hypervision does not introduce too much execution-time
overhead when applied to its natural targte: operating-system calls. Section 5
concludes and discusses future work. For better readability the proofs of most
technical results are moved in a separate Appendix. The Coq and the C+ARM
codes related to this paper are available at https://project.inria.fr/rlase.
2 Abstract Symbolic Execution
We borrow terminology from abstract interpretation in order to define a notion of
abstract symbolic execution (ase) for transition systems, over which our proof sys-
tem is built. We thus assume some basic knowledge of abstract interpretation [40],
including the following standard abstract-interpretation constructs:
– A set of concrete states S and a concrete transition relation →⊆ S × S.
– A set of abstract states S# organised as a lattice(v,⊥,>,∨,∧) where v
⊆ S#× S# is a partial order; ⊥ and > are minimal, respectively, maximal
elements with respect to the order; ∨ : S#× S#→ S# is the join operation,
satisfying q, q′ v q∨q′ for all abstract states q, q′ ∈ S#; and ∧ : S#×S#→ S#
is the meet operation, satisfying q ∧ q′ v q, q′ for all q, q′ ∈ S#.
– An abstract transition function
#→: S#→ S#. We use a function (rather than
a relation) because it is technically more convenient and does not restrict
generality: the nondeterminism and partiality of a relation are expressed by
a function returning a join of abstract states resp. the bottom element ⊥.
– A concretisation function γ : S#→ P (S), where P (S) is the powerset of S;
– Abstract transitions simulate concrete ones: for all s, s′ ∈ S, q ∈ S#, if s→ s′
and s ∈ γ(q) then s′ ∈ γ( #→(q′)), cf. commuting diagram in Figure 1 (left).
Other important constructions of abstract interpretation (abstraction func-
tions, Galois connections, widening, . . . ) are not required here; our goal is just
to use the terminology of abstract interpretation in order to conveniently define
abstract symbolic execution, without redefining everything from the ground up.
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Fig. 1. (left) abstract simulate concrete (right) concrete backwards-simulate abstract.
In addition to the above standard constructions we have the following ad-
ditional assumptions in ASE: the concretisation function γ completely defines
the order v and it “distributes” over ∨ and ∧; each abstract state has a comple-
ment, consistent with the concretisation function; and the inverse of the concrete
transition relation simulates the inverse of the abstract transition function.
Assumption 1 (Additional assumptions for ASE 1) For all abstract states
q, q′, q v q′ iff γ(q) ⊆ γ(q′); γ(q∨ q′) = γ(q)∪ γ(q′); γ(q∧ q′) = γ(q)∩ γ(q′); and
for each abstract state q there is an abstract state q such that γ(q) = S \ γ(q).
Assumption 2 (Additional assumptions for ASE 2) For all abstract states
q and all concrete state s′ ∈ γ( #→(q)), there exists s ∈ γ(q) such that s→ s′.
The latter is graphically illustrated by the commuting diagram in Fig. 1 (right).
ASE in Coq. The above concepts and assumptions enable us in forthcoming
sections to define and to reason about our proof system for RL “on paper”. When
we translate them to Coq we use the following representation5. Concrete states
have an arbitrary Coq type State. Concrete transitions are predicates on pairs
of states; in Coq this is written in the so-called curried form as trans: State
→ State → Prop, where Prop is Coq’s predefined type for logical statements
and → denotes both the “functional arrow” and logical implication (which, in
Coq’s logic, are essentially the same thing). Abstract states are defined to be the
type of predicates on states: AbsState : Type := State → Prop.
The concretisation function is expressed as a relation between abstract and
concrete states: gamma(q:AbsState)(s:State) := q s, i.e., the concretisation
of a abstract state q contains the concrete states s than satisfy q. Then, the order,
meet, join, bottom, top, and complement constructions on abstract states are
defined using, respectively, Coq’s predefined implication, disjunction, conjunction,
False, True, and negation constants and operations on type Prop. For example,
the order relation is ord(q q’: AbsState) := ∀ s, q s → q’ s. Finally, the
abstract transition function is defined by a form of strongest postcondition:
absTran(q:AbsState):AbsState:= fun s⇒ ∃s,q s’∧tran s’ s.
The ASE assumptions shown earlier in the section are then proved in Coq.
Example 1. Consider the transition system graphically depicted in Figure 2,
which computes in the variable s the sum of natural numbers up to m. We
use it as a running example. To encode it in Coq we define a type Location
5 Coq code is shown in teletype font mixed with some usual mathematical symbols
(∀, →, etc) for better readability. Coq notions are introduced gradually via examples.
7
i := 0l0 l1 l2
i ≥ m
s := s+ i+ 1
i := i+ 1
i < m
s := 0
Fig. 2. Running example: sum up to m.
with the constants l0, l1 and l2 and define the type State to be the Cartesian
product Location*nat*nat*nat. This is interpreted as concrete states being
quadruples consisting of a location and three natural numbers. The concrete
transition relation is then inductively defined to encode the three “arrows” in
Figure 2 (say, start, loop and stop), and their effect on the state variables:
Inductive trans: State → State → Prop :=
|start: ∀ m s i, trans(l0,m,s,i) (l1,m,0,0)
|loop: ∀ m s i, i < m → trans(l1,m,s,i) (l1,m,s+i+1,i+1)
|stop: ∀ m s i, i ≥ m → trans(l1,m,s,i) (l2,m,s,i).
3 A Proof System for Reachability-Logic Formulas
3.1 Reachability Logic
In this section we generalize RL - currently, a formalism for specifying program-
ming language semantics and a language-parametric program logic - to transition
systems, and provide it with a sound and relatively-complete proof system. Ab-
stract Symbolic Execution notions from Section 2 (concrete and abstract states,
concrete and abstract transitions, and the relations between them) are assumed.
Definition 1. A path is a finite sequence τ , s0 → · · · → sn−1 → sn. We
denote by Paths the set of paths. The length len(τ) of a path τ is the number of
transitions occurring in τ . For 0 ≤ i ≤ len(τ) we denote by τ(i) the i-th state in
the path τ . A path is complete if the last state on τ has no successor w.r.t. →.
We denote by comPaths the set of complete paths. For q ∈ S# we let Paths(q) ,
{τ ∈ Paths | τ(0) ∈ γ(q)}, and comPaths(q) , {τ ∈ comPaths | τ(0) ∈ γ(q)}. If
len(τ) ≥ k then we denote by τ |k.. the suffix of the path τ starting at state τ(k).
Example 2. In the transition system graphically depicted in Figure 2, the path
(l0, 1, 0, 0)→ (l1, 1, 0, 0)→ (l1, 1, 1, 1)→ (l2, 1, 1, 1) is also a complete path.
Definition 2. An RL formula is a pair l2 r with l, r ∈ S#. We let lhs(l2 r) , l
and rhs(l 2 r) , r. A path τ satisfies a formula l 2 r, denoted by τ |= l 2 r, if
τ ∈ comPaths(l) and there exists k ∈ {0 . . . len(τ)} such that τ(k) ∈ γ(r). An
RL formula is valid, denoted by |= l 2 r if for all τ ∈ comPaths(l), τ |= l 2 r.
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[Impl]
G ` G′
G ` {〈b, i, l 2 r〉} ∪G′ if l v r
[Split]
G ` {〈b, i + 1, l1 2 r〉, 〈b, i + 1, l2 2 r〉} ∪G′
G ` {〈b, i, l 2 r〉} ∪G′ if l v l1 ∨ l2
[Step]
G ` {〈true, i + 1, l′ 2 r〉} ∪G′
G ` {〈b, i, l 2 r〉} ∪G′ if l ∧ f v ⊥,
#→(l) v l′
[Circ]
G ∪ {〈false, 0, l′ 2 r′〉} ` {〈true, i + 1, l′′ 2 r〉} ∪G′
G ∪ {〈false, 0, l′ 2 r′〉} ` {〈true, i, l 2 r〉} ∪G′ if l v l
′, r′ v l′′
Fig. 3. A 4-rule proof system.
Thus, RL formula validity means a formula is satisfied by all complete paths
induced by a given transition relation (globally assumed in this section and
hereafter). This notion naturally specify the partial correctness of possibly par-
allel/nondeterministic systems, because, as far as validity is concerned, infinite
paths are not relevant, but, on the other hand, all complete paths are relevant.
Example 3. For the transition system in Figure 2, consider the RL formula
(l = l0 ∧m ≥ 0)2 (l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2). It specifies that, on all complete
paths starting in l0 with m ≥ 0, the sum of natural numbers up to m is computed
in the variable s. Note that complete paths are those ending in l2. Thus, the
above formula expresses the functional correctness of this simple system.
3.2 Proof system
We now present a proof system for proving the validity of sets of RL formulas.
Final states The validity of RL formulas depends on final states (without succes-
sors by transition). We assume an abstract state f such that s is a final state iff
s ∈ γ(f). For example, in the transition system in Figure 2, f , (l = l2).
Rules. For technical reasons (related to the system’s soundness proof) we shall
consider indexed formulas 〈b, i, l2r〉,i.e., triples consisting of a Boolean, a natural
number and an RL formula. There are four rules in our proof system (cf. Fig. 3),
all of which define deduction between sets of indexed formulas. We describe the
effect of the proof system on formulas, ignoring the indexes for now, as they are
only there to support the soundness proof (which we explain afterwards).
The first rule says that if the left hand-side l of a formula is in the v relation
with its right-hand side r then the formula is eliminated from the current set
of goals (i.e., it is considered proved: this makes sense since such formulas are
trivially valid). The second rule allows one to decompose a formula whose left-
hand-side is a disjunction, into two formulas, each of which takes one of the
disjuncts as its left hand-side. Note that over-approximations are allowed. The
third rule essentially replaces a formula’s left-hand side by its image by the
abstract transition function; again, over-approximations are allowed. The final
rule is what makes the system able to deal with unbounded behaviour in the
specification under proof. It says that, if the left hand-side l of a formula l 2 r
in the current set of goals is in the v relation with the left-hand-side l′ of a
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formula l′ 2 r′ from the initial set of goals, then l 2 r can be replaced by l′′ 2 r,
for any over-approximation l′′ of r′. That is, the formula l′ 2 r′ served locally as
an “acceleration” of the abstract transition function in the proof of l 2 r.
A proof in our proof system is a finite sequence of rule applications that
eventually eliminates all formulas (in a given set of formulas to be proved).
Definition 3 (proof). Assume a set G of indexed RL formulas of the form
〈false, 0, l 2 r〉. A proof is a sequence G0 . . . , Gn such that for all i ∈ 0 . . . n− 1,
G ` Gi+1 is obtained from G ` Gi by applying (bottom-up) one of the rules of
the proof system; and Gn = ∅. We let hereafter in this section G ,
⋃
0≤i≤nGi.
Example 4. We prove the following set of formulas on the transition in Fig. 2,
ignoring the indexes to simplify notations. This proof will also serve as an
illustration of the strategy for the relative completeness of our proof system.
G = {(l = l0 ∧m ≥ 0) 2 (l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2),
(l = l1 ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ m ∧ s = i× (i+ 1)/2) 2 (l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2)}
The first of the two formulas is the transition system’s functional correctness.
The second formula was chosen such that its left-hand side l = l1 ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤
m∧ s = i× (i+ 1)/2 is an “invariant” at location l1 starting from l = l0 ∧m ≥ 0.
Like in Hoare logic, proving partial correctness in RL uses invariants; unlike Hore
logic, however, we are not here bound by the syntax and semantics of a particular
programming language but reason at the abstract level of transition systems.
Let G0 , G. We apply [Step] to each the above formulas and get
G2 = {(l = l1 ∧ i = 0 ∧ s = 0 ∧m ≥ 0) 2 ((l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2),
((l = l1 ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ m ∧ s = i× (i+ 1)/2) ∨ (l = l2 ∧ i = m ∧ s = i ∗ (i+ 1)/2))
2(l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2)}
The first of the above formulas was obtained by “moving” its left-hand side6 from
l1 to l2, assigning i and s to 0 in the process. The second formula’s left-hand side
is actually a disjunction, because from l1 one can “stay” in l1 (hence the first
disjunct) or “move” to l2 (giving rise to the second disjunct).
We thus apply the [Split] rule in order to split the second formula in two:
G3 = {(l = l1 ∧ i = 0 ∧ s = 0 ∧m ≥ 0) 2 (l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2),
(l = l1 ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ m ∧ s = i× (i+ 1)/2) 2 (l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2),
(l = l2 ∧ i = m ∧ s = i ∗ (i+ 1)/2)) 2 (l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2)}
The last of the above formulas can be eliminated by [Impl] since its left hand-side
implies (or is v-smaller than) its right-hand side. This leaves in G4 the first two
formulas of G3. Next, we note that the second formula in G4 (also second in G3)
can be eliminated by [Circ], using itself (actually, its instance in G0); and the
first formula in G4 (also first in G3) can likewise be eliminated by [Circ] using the
same formula in G0 as above - since (l = l1∧i = 0∧s = 0∧m ≥ 0) v (l = l1∧0 ≤
i ≤ m ∧ s = i× (i+ 1)/2) holds. Each of the two eliminations above leave a copy
of the formula (l = l2 ∧ s = m× (m+ 1)/2) 2 (s = m× (m+ 1)/2)〉, which we
finally eliminate by [Impl], leaving us with an empty set of formulas to prove.
Thus, we have a proof of the initial set of formulas according to Definition 3.
6 Note that rules of our proof system never change a formula’s right-hand side.
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Soundness We now deal with the soundness of our proof system: a set of indexed
formulas that has a proof is a set of valid indexed formulas. Hereafter we assume
a set of indexed formulas G that has a proof according to Definition 3. In informal
explanations we often simply say “formula” instead of “indexed formula”.
The soundness proof is nontrivial because it cannot be performed by induction
on the length of derivations in the proof system (which would be the more-or-less
standard way to proceed). The reason is the [Circ] rule, which is not sound by
itself: this rule can prove any formula, valid or not, when used in an unrestricted
way (just apply [Circ] to the formula using itself and then [Impl]). The [Circ] rule
is crucial: without it the proof system is essentially abstract symbolic execution
and can only deal with bounded-length paths, which is not enough7. This same
phenomenon happens in all other versions of proof systems for RL we know of.
However, a proof by induction on the length of paths can be performed for
the subsystem consisting of the rules [Impl] and [Step]. The idea is that formulas
eliminated from the conclusion are satisfied by a given path, whenever formulas
added to hypotheses (by the [Step] rule) hold on shorter paths.
Unfortunately, this does not work when including the [Circ] and [Split] rules:
induction on shorter paths does not work, and neither does induction on proof
length. This is where indexes of formulas come into play: their role is to allow us to
combine the path-length well-founded order in a lexicographic product with well-
founded orders of the index components. Pairs (τ , 〈b, j, l 2 r〉) ∈ comPaths × G8
such that τ ∈ comPaths(l), are ordered iff: either the path lengths are ordered by
<; or, in case the path lengths are equal, the Boolean components of indexes are
ordered by false < true; or, when both path lengths and Boolean components are
equal, the natural-number component of indexes (upper bounded by the proof’s
length) are ordered by >. This is a lexicographical product of three well-founded
relations; it is thus itself well-founded, and it enables an induction that proves
the soundness of our proof system. We now state our main lemma that we prove
according to this well-founded induction and whose corollary is soundness.
Lemma 1. For all 〈b, j, l2 r〉 ∈ G and τ ∈ comPaths(l), it holds that τ |= l2 r.
We say a set G of indexed formulas is valid if for every 〈i, l2 r〉 ∈ G, |= l2 r.
As a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and of the definition of validity we obtain:
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If G has a proof then G is valid.
3.3 A Completeness Result
Soundness is important but is still only about half of the story, because, e.g., a
system that proves nothing is sound. We still need to demonstrate the ability of
our system to actually “prove something”. This has two aspects: a theoretical one,
called completeness, which says that all valid formulas can, in principle, be proved
(possibly up to “oracles” dealing with certain sub-tasks); and a practical one:
applying the proof system on concrete examples. We note that in our case theory
7 We note that, even though the validity of RL formulas only involves finite paths,
over the (infinite) set of all such paths the sup of path lengths is typically infinite.
8 Here, the set of formulas G is that introduced at the end of Definition 3.
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and practice are not disjoint, as the completeness result suggests a practical
strategy for actually proving all valid formulas. We deal with the theoretical
aspect in this section, and illustrate the practical one in the next section.
The completeness result relies on the abstract states being precise enough, as
formalised by the following assumption. Given a finite set of indexed RL formulas
G to be proved, and a set of terminal states encoded by an abstract state f , the
assumption says that certain co-reachable sets of states depending on f and on
right-hand sides of formulas in G are exactly represented by abstract states:
Assumption 3 (Coreachable States as Abstract States) For each 〈b, i, l2
r〉 ∈ G, there exists coReach+f (r) ∈ S# with γ(coReach
+
f (r)) = {s ∈ S | ∀τ ∈
Paths(s). τ(len(τ)) ∈ γ(f) implies (∃k)1 ≤ k ≤ len(τ) such that τ(k) ∈ γ(r)}.
That is, the concretisation of the abstract state coReach+f (r) consists of the set of
concrete states from which all paths τ of length ≥ 1 that “end up” in a terminal
state in γ(f) are bound to “encounter” a state in γ(r) along the way.
This assumption may appear strong, but it is trivially satisfied by our encoding
of ASE in Coq; essentially, this is because abstract states are predicates over
concrete states and the concretisation function is just predicate satisfaction, and
therefore one can define coReach+f (r) , λs : State.∀τ ∈ Paths(s).f(τ(len(τ)))→
(∃k)1 ≤ k ∧ k ≤ len(τ) ∧ r(τ(k)), which satisfies the above assumption.
The next definition introduces the notion of terminator for an RL formula.
Definition 4. The RL formula I 2 r is a terminator for the RL formula l 2 r
if I ∧ f v ⊥, #→(I) v I ∨ r and l v I.
Note that this essentially makes I an inductive invariant starting from states in
the concretisation of l: the inclusion
#→(I) v I ∨ r says that I is an invariant
starting from concretisations of l except in states that are concretisations of r.
The important thing about terminators is that, together with the formulas
they are terminators of, they constitute (as indexed formulas) a set that has a
proof in our proof system (according to Definition 3). This is stated by Lemma 3
below, whose proof is kept in the main paper body, since it shows the general
strategy for proving an RL formula together with its terminator. We note that
the proof shown in Example 4 is just an instance of this general strategy.
We shall first need a monotony property of the abstract transition function:
Lemma 2. For all q, q′ ∈ S# with q v q′, #→(q) v #→(q′) holds.
Lemma 3. If I2r is a terminator for l2r, then {〈false, 0, l2r〉, 〈false, 0, I2r〉}
has a proof.
Proof. Let G0 , {〈false, 0, l2 r〉, 〈false, 0, I 2 r〉} From l v I (cf. Definition 4 of
terminators) we obtain using Lemma 2, that
#→(l) v #→(I) and thus #→(l) v I∨r.
Using this information we apply [Step] to the first formula and obtain G1 =
{〈true, 1, I ∨ r2 r〉, 〈false, 0, I 2 r〉} and then by similarly applying [Step] to the
second formula, G2 = {〈true, 1, I ∨ r2 r〉}. We then apply the rule [Split], which
generates the set G3 , {〈true, 2, I 2 r〉, 〈true, 2, r2 r〉}. Using [Impl] this reduces
to G4 , {〈true, 2, I2 r〉}. Next, we apply [Circ] to obtain G5 , {〈true, 3, r2 r〉})
We can thus apply [Impl] again, which leaves us with G6 = ∅: the proof is done.
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Remark 1. Lemma 2 essentially reduces the proof of any RL formula l 2 r to
the discovery of predicates I that over-approximate the left-hand side l and are
either stable under the transition relation or “end up” in the right-hand side r of
the formula. One can note similarities with induction loop invariants for proving
pre/post conditions of loops in Hoare logics. The difference is, again, that here
we can reason on abstract transition systems instead of concrete programs.
The next question is how to obtain such predicates. This is where abstract
states of the form coReach+f (r) whose existence is stated by Assumption 3 occur.
Lemma 4. If |= l 2 r and l ∧ r v ⊥, coReach+f (r) 2 r is a terminator for l 2 r.
We thus obtain our completeness result, which essentially says that valid RL
formulas can be included in a possible larger set of formulas that has a proof.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Assume a finite set G of (false, 0)-indexed RL
formulas. If |= G then there exists a finite set G′ ⊇ G that has a proof.
Proof. Set G′ , G ∪
⋃
〈false,0,l2r〉∈G{〈false, 0, coReach
+
f (r) 2 r〉}, and use Lem-
mas 3 and 4 to build proofs for pairs {〈false, 0, l2 r〉, 〈false, 0, coReach+f (r) 2 r〉}.
In case l ∧ r 6v ⊥ for some of the formulas in G, first use the [Split] rule to
decompose the formulas into l ∧ r 2 r (which do satisfy (l ∧ r) ∧ r v ⊥) and
l ∧ r 2 r (which are eliminated by [Impl]).
We conclude this section with two observations.
The first observation is that for the ASE framework that we implement in
Coq (which, as explained above, satisfies Assumption 3), our completeness result
can be expressed more traditionally as relative completeness, i.e., completeness
relative to an oracle that can decide the validity of implications between state
predicates in Coq’s logic. Indeed, in such cases we can obtain terminators by
“choosing” the appropriate formulas coReach+f (r)2r and running the proof system
with them; the latter requires the ability to know whether certain abstract states
are ordered by v, which, on our Coq implementation of ASE, amounts to check
whether the implication between state predicates holds for all concrete states.
Since Coq is an interactive system the oracle is here, ultimately, the user.
The second observation is that, even though the completeness result is a
theoretical one, it does provide us with a strategy for our proof system: for a
given set G of formulas to prove, we need to add the corresponding terminators
in order to obtain a proof. It is the user’s responsibility to come up with the
appropriate terminators, whose left-hand side, as noted in Remark 1 above,
generalise inductive loop invariants. Conceptually, this is a generalisation to RL
and transition-system of program verification in Hoare logics, where users must
produce inductive loop invariants in order to help prove pre/post conditions.
4 Implementation and Case Study
In this section we describe the implementation of our proof system and of its
soundness proof in the Coq proof assistant, and the application of the resulting
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Coq RL prover to the functional correctness of a security hypervisor model. We
also show an excerpt of the C+ARM implementation of the hypervisor and give
some figures based on experiments with it, which show that hypervision introduce
an acceptable amount of execution-time overhead on operating-system calls.
Coq [3] is a proof assistant that implements a higher-order logic called the
calculus of inductive constructions. Coq proofs are lambda-terms that can be
independently checked by a relatively simple typechecking algorithm, either
the one implemented in Coq or external ones. In this sense, Coq proofs are
independently-checkable certificates; we thus implemented our prof system in
Coq in order to obtain a Coq-certified prover for RL formulas. Thus, when we
apply the implemented proof system to the hypervisor case study we obtain a
high degree of trust in what has been proved, which is quite important in our
case since both the soundness proof and the hypervisor proof are quite intricate.
4.1 Proof of Soundness in Coq
The implementation of our proof system in Coq and the soundness proof closely
follow their description in this paper. The “paper version” of the proof system is
built upon ASE; thus, the Coq version relies on an implementation of ASE in
Coq, already shown in Section 2. There is an arbitrary State type for concrete
states and a transition relation trans: State → State → Prop, which are Coq
parameters to be instantiated for given applications (e.g., the security hypervisor).
The other ASE notions and assumptions become Coq definitions and lemmas.
For readability reasons we will not be showing much Coq code in this subsec-
tion. We discuss, however, some choices that we made for the implementation.
The first choice, already mentioned above, is to implement the proof system
and to prove its soundness in a parameterised setting. The second choice is the
kind of embedding of our logic (RL) and of its proof system in Coq’s logic and
proof system. We chose deep embedding at this level - the only possible choice if
we want to prove soundness. The alternative shallow embedding would consist
in “emulating” our proof system rule by those of Coq’s calculus of inductive
constructions, which may not be possible and would definitely make a soundness
proof impossible, since Coq cannot reason about itself. However, for usability
reasons we shallowly embed abstract states as predicates of type State → Prop
in Coq’s own logic. This is essential for being able to actually use the proof
system, which requires an effective mechanism to reason about abstract states
(e.g/, proving that two abstract states are in the abstract order relation). Letting
abstract states reuse the predefined Prop type enables us to reuse many predefined
proof tactics that belong with this type; reimplementing all of them, as a deep
embedding of abstract states in Coq would require, is essentially unthinkable.
These choices have further consequences for the usability of the proof system,
induced by what is and is not allowed by the Prop type. The most important
issue is that equality of terms of this type is not decidable in Coq’s logic, thus,
neither is the equality of abstract states (based on Prop). Thus, in order to
implement sets of RL formulas (that are just pairs of abstract states) we cannot
use various existing implementations of sets in Coq, which all require a decidable
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equality on set elements. As a consequence, for operations involving sets of RL
formulas such as those employed by our proof system (e.g., adding/removing an
element to/from a set) we had to use Coq relations rather than functions, since
the corresponding functions require a decidable equality test on set elements.
Using relations rather than functions means that, when the proof system is
applied to actual examples, an intensively used operation such as removing a
formula from a set won’t be performed by automatic function computation, but
by interactive proof, which thus requires further effort from the user.
Fortunately, Coq has an elaborate tactic language that can automate, e.g.,
proofs for such auxiliary set operations. One writes a tactic per operation once and
for all, thereby relieving the user from proving facts about auxiliary operations
over and over again instead on focusing on the system under verification.
Overall, we strike a balance between being able to prove the proof system’s
soundness and being able to apply it. The Coq development for the soundness
proof is about 1500 lines long and it required about one person-month of work.
4.2 Hypervisor Case Study: General Description
We now describe our case study: a security hypervisor for machine code. The
main idea for the supervisor is to “scan” machine-code instructions before letting
them be executed by a processor in kernel (privileged) mode. Running arbitrary
instructions in privileged mode is a security risk since an attacker could, e.g.,
access memory zones it should not, or even completely “freeze” the processor.
Most instructions are normal, i.e., the processor can safely execute them in
privileged mode. These typically include arithmetical and logical operations on
user-reserved registers. Other instructions are special : they present a potential
security risk when executed in privileged mode, such as for example instructions
that access memory-management data structures. Before they are executed the
hypervisor uses its knowledge on the current state of the processor to check
whether there is an actual security risk. If this is not the case then the hypervisor
passes on the instruction to the processor for execution. If there is a risk, the
hypervisors take appropriate actions such as blocking further code execution.
The main functional correctness properties of the hypervisor are that (i)
all instructions passed on to the processor are safe to be executed and (ii) the
hypervised code’s semantics is not altered. That is, the hypervisor does all what it
is supposed to do and no more than it is supposed to do. A crucial non-functional
property of the hypervisor, which guided its current design, is that hypervision
should slow down code execution as little as possible. This excludes, for example,
machine-code emulation by the supervisor, since such software emulation is
several magnitude-orders slower than hardware execution in a processor. Another
unrealistic design is to hypervise and execute instructions one by one: indeed, the
alternation between hypervision and execution is a major source of execution-time
overhead, because it involves costly operations such as saving and restoring a
software image of the processor’s state. Thus, the hypervisor must deal with as
many instructions as possible before letting them be executed by the processor.
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Fig. 4. General structure of hypervisor.
A general graphical depiction of the hypervisor is shown in Figure 4. The
locations correspond to several modes in which the hypervisor (plus the hypervised
system) may be. In hyper mode the hypervisor scans instructions. If an instruction
is normal the hypervisor accepts it and goes on to supervise the next instruction.
Now, in many situations, the latter is the actual next instruction in the sequence
of instructions constituting a given piece of code. Except, of course, for jump
instructions, which branch at different tresses than that of the next-in-sequence
one. Since the hypervisor does not emulate code execution (this possibility was
eliminated for efficiency reasons), it has, in general, no way of knowing after
jump instructions which is the next instruction that it should scan.
The idea is then to use the processor execution in a controlled way in order to
find out the missing information. The hypervised code is altered : the problematic
jump instruction is replaced by a so-called trap instruction, and the current
sequence of hypervised instructions is “flushed” to the processor for execution.
In our state machine in in Figure 4 this amounts to switching from the hyper to
the proc mode. When the inserted trap execution is reached at execution time, a
software image of the processor state is generated, thanks to which the hypervisor
“knows” where to continue hypervision after the jump. It can thus go back to
hyper mode after having restoring the jump instruction in order to avoid leaving
alterations in the code; then, hypervision of the code is resumed.
The same mechanism is used when a special instructions is encountered by the
hypervisor: it is replaced by a trap instruction, the system goes to proc mode for
executing the current list of hypervised instructions, and when trap is executed,
appropriate action is taken: execution is either blocked (which corresponds to
switching from proc to blocked in Figure 4), the system switches back to hyper
mode, after having restored the special instruction in place of the trap.
As already noted previously these “switches” from code hypervision to code
execution generate much execution overhead. Now, the mode-switches generated
by special instructions cannot be avoided, otherwise, the hypervisor may violate
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its functional-correctness requirements. Switches that can be avoided are only
among the ones generated by jump instructions the hypervisor could not resolve.
The idea is to save in the hypervisor’s state the sequence of instructions
already hypervised in the current hypervision phase. In case a jump instruction is
encountered, which branches to an instructions in this list, then there is no need
to use the above-mentioned trap-execution mechanism. Specifically, if the jump
instruction is conditional and only one of the two addresses it may go to is in
the already-hypervised instruction list, then hypervision can safely continues at
the other address since a second hypervison of an instruction sequence is useless.
Moreover, if both tresses a jump instruction may go to are in the current list,
then, the need for hypervision is eliminated thereafter, since the code execution
will “loop” among instructions already hypervised and known to be “safe”. In
our state-machine representation this amounts to switching to the free mode.
The same thing happens for unconditional jumps that go to an instruction in the
already-hypervised instruction list. Only in the remaining cases (all jumps go
outside the list in question) is that trap-and-execution mechanism required.
This optimisation is not arbitrary, as it deals well standard compilation of
while-loops into machine code. The first time a loop is encountered it needs, of
course, to be hypervised; but when the conditional jump of the loop’s compiled
code is encountered, which either repeats the loop body of goes after it, the
hypervisor need not use a trap-and-execution mechanism to “solve” the condition:
all instructions loop body have already been hypervised, thus, hypervision just
continues after the loop body. Machine code that we used in benchmarks contains
many such loops (active-waiting loops that just decrease a timer counter).
Our hypervisor model has one last mode: error, which corresponds to unex-
pected situations either the hypervisor or the processor detects in a piece of code:
for example, binary code that corresponds to no known instruction.
Implementing the hypervisor. Our hypervisor has been implemented for the
ARMv6 architecture. Nevertheless, its design allows for a relatively easy evolution
for more recent ARM architectures or, with a bit more effort, on different
architectures such as Intel’s x86/x86 64. The hypervision code has been carefully
designed to be as simple as possible and as close as possible to its Coq model.
Listing 1.1. Hypervisor analysis code
int found_next = findNextSpecial(state , start , &next , MAX_ITER );
if (found_next) {
platform.setupTrap(state , next);
platform.execute(state); // switches to processor mode}
int findNextSpecial(void *state , addr_t start , addr_t *found ,
const int max_iter) {
Hypervisor_InstrInfo info;
addr_t a = 0;
for (int iter = 0 ; iter < max_iter ; ++iter) {
platform.instructionInfo(state , a, &info);
if (is_special_instruction (&info)) {
*found = a;
return 1;
}
a += info.length;
}
return 0;}
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The hypervisor’s code consists in about 4000 lines of C code and 400 lines
of ARM assembler. As an example, Listing 1.1 shows C code excerpts from
hypervisor primitives. The listing shows the core of the analysis engine. It calls
findNextSpecial to find the address of the next special instruction and replaces
it by a trap that will return to the hypervisor code upon execution. The second
function shows how findNextSpecial is implemented. For the sake of clarity,
debugging messages and some error handling has been stripped from the listings.
The hypervisor has been evaluated on a raspberry pi platform. We performed
two kinds of experiments to measure the impact of hypervision on execution time.
First, we run the benchmarks in privileged mode. In this mode, the hypervisor
needs to deal with all the binary code. Second, we run the same benchmarks as
userland tasks on a multi-task guest system. Only the guest system is run in
privileged mode and thus it is the only code subject to analysis by our hypervisor.
The benchmarks consist of computation-intensive code: AES encryption, the
Dhrystone CPU benchmark, and a serial port peripheral driver code. The AES
encryption code is the open source embedded TLS by ARM9. The Dhrystone
benchmark is the 2.1 version. We measure the overhead using hardware timers.
Results given in Table 1 are the overhead ratio of each benchmark, for each
execution mode. For example, an overhead value 2 means that the code is two
times slower when run under hypervision rather than directly on the hardware.
The results show that the hypervisor introduces a huge overhead when all guest
code is run through the hypervisor, with the exception of the driver benchmark
that stays reasonable. This can be explained because, as many drivers, its logic
relies on busy waiting on the hardware peripheral. Thus, its execution time
directly depends on the peripheral rather than on the execution speed of the
driver. We do not have results for AES for its execution time was too long to
get an actual result. However, a hypervisor is not designed to run arbitrary user
code, but OS code with user applications running inside. For such benchmarks
the overhead remains under 15%,which makes the approach viable.
Benchmark Privileged Userland
AES – 1.003
Dhrystone 299.7 1.14
Driver 2.4 1.08
Table 1. Execution time overhead introduced by the hypervisor
4.3 Coq model of Hypervisor
The transition-system model of the hypervisor has the general structure of the
state machine shown in Figure 4. In addition to the mode state-variable, which
ranges over the values hyper, proc, free, block, and error, there are eight other
state variables that constitute the State type. Thus, the type State is a Cartesian
product of nine components. We call these components (by convention10):
9 https://tls.mbed.org
10 There are no state variables in Coq but, by convention, when we refer to the various
components of the State type in Coq code we use the above-given names.
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– hi, a natural number pointing to the current instruction to be analysed;
– lo, a natural number pointing to the current instruction to be executed;
– oldlo, a natural number memorising the previous version of lo (if any);
– i, an instruction (more about these below), which memorises the instruction
that was replaced by a trap instruction when code is instrumented;
– code, a list of instructions, modelling the piece of code being hypervised;
– seen, a list memorising instructions seen in the current hypervision phase;
– P, which models the part of the processor’s internal state that is relevant
to the control flow of the current code being hypervised; since this internal
state is a black box, P has an arbitrary type called procState, with some
operations axiomatically defined on (more about this below);
– len, a natural number memorising how many instructions were executed.
Before we show in a forthcoming paragraph the Coq encoding of the transition
relation we describe some additional artifacts the transition relation refers to.
Instructions and their execution. It is, of course, unrealistic to encode in Coq the
whole ARM instruction list. In our model we only need to distinguish between
normal, special, trap, and halt instructions. In Coq this is encoded as a type Ins
having one value norm n (resp. spec n , resp trap n) for each natural number
n, and one value halt. The latter instruction represents the end of the current
code execution. The effect of the other instruction is modelled by an abstract
function (technically, a Coq parameter), declared as having the following type:
effect : option Ins → procState → procState
That is, effect takes: a value of type option Ins (which is either Some i, i.e., an
instruction of type Ins, or the constant None11), and a value of type procState
(i.e., the part of the processor’s internal state that is relevant to the control flow
of the current code being hypervised); and produces a value of type procState.
The actual definition of this function is not given, since we do not model the
semantics of ARM instructions. Rather, some of its properties are axiomatised.
For example, it is stated that the effect of an instruction replaced (at code
analysis/instrumentation time) by a corresponding trap instruction is the same
as that of the trap instruction in question. This is used for proving the requirement
that the hypervisor does not alter the semantics of the hypervised code.
Static versus dynamic control flow. By static control flow of a piece of code we
mean the (typically, incomplete) control-flow information that is known without
executing the code. The instructions that jump at constant addresses (or do
not jump at all) have such a statically-determined control flow; by contrast, the
control flow for instructions that jump at addresses that dynamically depends on
procState (e.g., on register values) is not determined statically but dynamically.
The static control flow is used during code-analysis phases since, for efficiency
reasons, the hypervisor does not emulate code execution in any form; whereas
the dynamic control flow is, naturally, used during code-execution phases.
11 Option types of this kind will also be used by other artifacts of our Coq model.
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For static control flow we use a type Next consisting of values none, one n,
and two n m for natural numbers n and m, which encodes the three possible cases
of an instruction having none, one, or two statically known successors.
The static control flow itself is modelled by an abstractly declared function:
nxt : list Ins → nat → Next
that, given a list of instructions and a natural-number position, returns the next
statically-known address(es) of the next instruction(s) for the instruction at the
given position in the given list. Naturally, it is axiomatically specified that, if the
given position exceeds the given list length, the value none is returned.
The dynamic control flow is also modelled by an abstractly declared function:
findNext : list Ins → nat → procState → option nat
that, given a list of instructions, a natural-number position, and the processor’s
state, returns the address of the next dynamically known instruction (if any) for
the instruction at the given position in the given list. Naturally, relationships
between static and dynamic control have to be stated axiomatically: i.e., if the
static control flow is known for a given instruction then its static and dynamic
control flows coincide. One last artifact is required by the transition relation.
Code instrumentation. When the hypervisor encounters a special instruction, or
a normal instruction for which it cannot statically determine which instruction
comes next (e.g., a conditional jump instruction depending on register values), or
the halt instruction, it saves the problematic instruction in its state and replaces
it with a trap. In our Coq model this code instrumentation is modelled by a
function changeIns. The function itself is quite simple, thus we do not show it
here. What’s more important is that, for modelling and verification purposes only,
we adopt the following convention: halt is replaced by trap 0; and instructions
of the form norm n, resp. spec n are replaced with trap 2*n+2, resp. trap
2*n+1. This gives us a bijective correspondence between the instructions that are
replaced and the trap instructions that replace them, allowing us to axomatically
specify that the effects of a replaced instruction and of the instruction replacing
it are the same. This property is essential in proving one of the functional
correctness requirements: the hypervisor does not alter the code’s semantics.
What is actually important here is the above-mentioned bijective correspondence
and the same-effect property based on it; the way we achieve it (with an encoding
based on zero, non-zero even, and odd values) is only a matter of modelling.
Transition relation. The transition relation trans : State → State → Prop
is defined inductively, just like the one shown in Example 1 but significantly more
complex. To illustrate it we show the transitions that originate in proc mode.
1. the current instruction is normal, next instruction is statically known and
was not seen in current analysis: move to next instruction. Hereafter, the
predicate In tests the presence of an element in a list, :: constructs lists, and
nth returns the nth element of a list (or None if the element does not exist).
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∀ k lo hi oldlo i code pos seen P len, nth code hi = (Some(norm k))→
nxt code hi = (one pos)→ ¬ In pos (hi::seen) →
trans (hyper, lo, hi, oldlo, i, code, seen, P, len)
(hyper, lo, pos, oldlo, i, code, (hi :: seen), P, len)
2. current instruction is normal, next instruction is statically known and already
seen in current analysis: no more hypervision needed, go to free mode.
∀ k lo hi oldlo i code pos seen P len, nth code hi = (Some(norm k))→
nxt code hi = (one pos)→ In pos (hi::seen) →
trans (hyper,lo, hi, oldlo ,i,code, seen, P, len)
(free, lo, pos, oldlo, i, code, (hi :: seen), P, len)
3. current instruction is a conditional branching, left branch has already been
seen, right branch is new : continue hypervision in the right branch.
∀ k lo hi oldlo i code l r seen P len, nth code hi = (Some(norm k))→
nxt code hi = (two l r)→ In l (hi::seen) → ¬ In r (hi::seen) →
trans (hyper,lo, hi, oldlo ,i,code, seen, P, len)
(hyper, lo, r, oldlo,i,code, (hi :: seen), P, len)
4. a case symmetrical to the previous one, obtained by inverting left and right.
5. current instruction is a conditional branching, both left and right branches
have already been seen: no more hypervision needed, go to free mode.
∀ k lo hi oldlo i code l r seen P len, nth code hi = (Some(norm k))→
nxt code hi = (two l r)→ In l (hi::seen) →In r (hi::seen) →
trans (hyper,lo, hi, oldlo ,i,code, seen, P, len)
(free, lo, hi, oldlo, i, code, (hi :: seen), P, len)
6. current instruction is normal, next instruction is not statically known: mem-
orise it, set current instruction to corresponding trap, and go to proc mode.
∀ k lo hi oldlo i code pos l r seen P len,nth code hi=(Some(norm k))→
(nxt code hi = none ∨ (nxt code hi = one pos ∧¬ In pos (hi::seen)) ∨
(nxt code hi = two l r ∧¬ In l (hi::seen) ∧¬ In l (hi::seen))) →
trans (hyper,lo, hi, oldlo ,i,code, seen, P, len)
(proc,lo,hi,oldlo,(norm k),(changeIns code hi (trap(2*k+2))),seen,P,len)
7. current instruction is special: memorise it, set current instruction to the
corresponding trap instruction, and go to proc mode.
∀ k lo hi oldlo i seen P len,nth code hi = (Some(spec k)) →
trans (hyper,lo, hi, oldlo ,i,code, seen, P, len)
(proc,lo,hi,oldlo,(spec k),(changeIns code hi (trap(2*k+1))),seen,P,len)
8. current instruction is halt: memorise it, set current instruction to the corre-
sponding trap instruction, and go to proc mode.
∀ k lo hi oldlo i seen P len,nth code hi = (Some(spec k)) →
trans (hyper,lo, hi, oldlo ,i,code, seen, P, len)
(proc,lo,hi,oldlo,halt,(changeIns code hi (trap 0)),seen,P,len)
There are nine other such similarly-defined transitions between the other modes
of the transition system; we do not list them all here due to lack of space.
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4.4 Coq Proof of Hypervisor’s Functional Correctness
The functional correctness of the hypervisor is expressed as two two Coq theorems.
The first theorem states an invariance property, saying that, at all times, the
hypervisor does not let special (i.e., potentially dangereous) instructions be
executed by the processor. The second theorem states a partial-correctness
property: when the hypervised code’s execution ends, its global effect on the
processor’s state is the same as as that of the same code running without
hypervision. The first property must hold at all times since special instructions
may occur at any time; by contrast, the second property is only relevant at the
end of the execution of the hypervised code; indeed, due to code instrumentation
during hypervision phases the property may not even hold at all times.
All special instructions are hypervised. For this invariance property we define
the set of initial states of the system: the initial mode is hyper (since code must
first be hypervised befor being run), the hypervisor’s and processor’s instruction
pointers hi resp. lo are set to zero (by convention, the address of the first
instruction in the code), etc. We also define a general notion of invariants as
state predicates holding in all reachable states; the latter are defined inductively.
Inductive reachable : State → Prop :=
|zero : ∀ s, init s → reachable s (*init characterises initial states*)
|succ : ∀ s s’, reachable s → trans s s’ → reachable s’.
Definition invariant(P:State → Prop) := ∀ s, reachable s → P s.
Our invariance property is then stated as the following theorem:
Theorem hypervisor hypervises:
invariant(fun s⇒match s with (mode,lo, , , ,code, , , )⇒
(mode=proc∨mode=free)→ ∃ ins,nth code lo = Some ins ∧∀k,ins6=spec k end).
The fun anonymous-function construction here defines a predicate, which holds
for the states whose relevant components: mode, instruction pointer lo, and code
(extracted from states by the match construction12) satisfy the constraint that
whenever mode is proc or free, the current instruction is not a special one.
Hypervisor does not alter global code semantics. For this partial-correctness
property we also need to characterise final states (i.e., without successor in the
transition relation) since partial correctness deals with executions ending in such
states. These are states where the mode is either proc or free and the current
instruction being executed is either halt or a trap 0 instruction that replaces it.
We also need to characterise unhypervised code execution, since our property
is about comparing it with hypervised execution. We thus inductively define a
predicate run that “applies” the effect function (that abstractly defines the
effect of instructions) for a sequence of instructions of a given length, starting and
ending at a given address an with given initial and final processor states. Specif-
ically, run code (first,procInit) len (last,procFinal) holds if, by executing
12 Underscores match state components that do not occur in a state predicate.
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len instructions from code, starting at address first from initial processor state
procInit, the address last and processor state procFinal are reached. The
partial-correctness property is expressed as a the validity of an RL formula:
Theorem hypervisor does not interfere : Valid(init 2 (final ∧ fun s →
match s with( ,lo, , , ,code, ,P,len)⇒run code (0,procInit) len (lo,P)end))
That is, starting from initial states (characterised by state predicate init - the
one also used for the above invariance property), all executions that terminate
end up in a state satisfying (of course) final and, moreover, by running the code
unsupervised from the initial address zero and initial processor state procInit,
after len instructions (whose value is “extracted” from the final state), the final
address lo and final processor state P also coincide with those of the final state.
Proving the partial-correctness property. We apply the strategy formalised in the
proof of Lemma 3 and illustrated in Example 4 on a small scale. Given the formula
init 2 r to be proved, we find a state predicate I such that the implications I
→ ¬ final, (absTrans I) → (I ∨ r), and init → I are valid.
Since in our case (and, we expect, in many others) both r → final and init
→ ¬ r are valid, by setting I’ , (I ∧ final) ∨ r the three original impli-
cations amount to init → I’ and (absTrans I’) → I’; and since absTrans
was defined to be the strongest-postcondition predicate transformer, the validity
of the last two implications amount to stating that I’ is an inductive invariant.
Thus, proving RL formulas amounts is reduced to discovering inductive
invariants. This is, of course, a difficult task for nontrivial transition relations and
properties involving quantifier alternation such as the ones at hand. There are,
however, systematic techniques for doing this, discussed in the next paragraph.
For proving the RL formula of interest an inductive invariant consisting of a
conjunction of 30 predicates was found. Fortunately we were able to reuse many
(specifically, 23) of the predicates required for proving the invariance property.
Proving the invariance property. For invariance properties one can apply the
invariant-strengthening technique: attempting to prove a predicate is inductive
(Coq definitions follow), and, in case of failure, examining which of the transitions
failed to preserve the predicate and deriving new predicates that, taken in
conjunction with the original one, are potentially inductive. This typically needs
to be iterated many times before an actual inductive conjunction is obtained.
Thus, a näıve application of this systematic principle in Coq quickly becomes
unmanageable because of the case-explosion problem: each inductiveness proof
generates a large number of subgoals, and when new conjuncts are added to a
predicate in attempts to make it inductive, both the new and old conjuncts need
to undergo the new proof attempt (and all the subsequent ones), which requires
the user to re-prove over and over again subgoals that we already proved in earlier
attempts. As a consequence proof sizes and user efforts become unmanageable.
We thus propose a more incremental approach. We say a predicate P is
conditionally inductive w.r.t. a list L of predicates if, by assuming the conjunction
∧L holds on pre-states, P is preserved by transitions from pre to post-states:
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Definition ind cond(P: State → Prop)(L: list(State → Prop)):= ∀ s s’,
(∧L) s → P s → trans s s’ → P s’.
A predicate is thus inductive iff it is conditionally inductive w.r.t. an empty list.
The following lemma exploits conditional inductiveness.
Lemma ind: ∀P L,inductive(∧L)→ind cond P L→inductive (∧(P::L))
It is used as follows: assume that a previous attempt at proving P inductive
failed, and the user came up with the list L of predicates for which she “believes”
that inductive (∧(P::L)) can be proved. By using the above lemma, this
amounts to proving the conditional inductiveness of P w.r.t. L, which is typically
feasible when L is adequately chosen, and then (separately) the inductiveness of
of the conjunction ∧(L), where P not involved any more. Thus, unlike the näıve
approach, the “old” predicate P, which is itself a typically large conjunction, does
not need to be dealt with over and over again when it is further strengthened.
The current Coq development for the case study is about 2900 lines long (in
addition to the 1500 for the proof system’s soundness and strategy). Most of the
two man-months effort for the case study (in addition to one man-month for the
proof system’s soundness and strategy) were dedicated to proving invariants.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduce in this paper an approach for proving partial-correctness properties
and invariance properties for transition systems. We thus generalize symbolic
execution and Reachability Logic (RL) from their usual setting (programs) to
transition systems, and propose a proof system for RL, for which we prove
soundness (on paper and in the Coq proof assistant) as well as a completeness
result. The completeness result has practical value as it suggests a strategy for
the proof system that, provided with adequate user input in the form of inductive
invariants, is certain to succeed on valid RL formulas over a given transition
system. The Coq implementation of the soundness proof provides us with a Coq-
certified interactive prover for RL, which we applied to a nontrivial case study of a
security hypervisor we designed in earlier. The reduction of partial correctness to
invariance, and an incremental approach we designed for proving invariants, were
helpful in enabling us to complete the case study within reasonable time and effort
limits. The C+ARM implementation of the hypervisor and some benchmarks are
also briefly presented, which indicate that the hypervisor introduces a limited
amount of execution-time overhead on operating-system calls.
The main line of future work is exploiting our RL interactive prover in more
general ways that that given by reducing each formula’s proof to that of one
(typically large) inductive invariant. This technique does work, both in theory
and in practice, but it does not result in modular proofs, which our proof system
allows in principle; for example, separately proving an RL formula characterising
a loop, and thereafter simplifying the proof by replacing the loop by the formula.
We are also planning to refine our hypervisor model with further optimisations
that we implemented to enhance its performances, and to prove the functional
correctness of the refined model using the envisaged modular proof technique.
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Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 5. For all s ∈ S, q ∈ S# and τ ∈ Paths, if s ∈ γ(q) and s = τ(0) then
for any 0 ≤ k ≤ len(τ), τ(k) ∈ γ(Reach#(q)).
Proof. Use Reach#(q) w #→k(q) for all k ≥ 0 and prove τ(k) ∈
#→(q) by induction
on k. Use the property s ∈ γ(q) implies s′ ∈ #→(q) for all s′ such that s→ s′ of
abstract interpretation (cf. Fig 1, left) for establishing the induction step.
Lemma 6. If τ ∈ Paths(q) and len(τ) ≥ 1 then τ |1.. ∈ Paths(
#→(q)).
Proof. Let τ , s0 → s1 · · · with s0 ∈ γ(q). Then, τ |1.. is the suffix of τ starting at
s1, and all we need to prove is that s1 ∈ γ(
#→(q)), which is a simple consequence
of the fact that the abstract transition function simulates concrete transitions.
Lemma 1 For all 〈b, j, l 2 r〉 ∈ G and τ ∈ comPaths(l), it holds that τ |= l 2 r.
Proof. We define an order ≺ on the product comPaths × G by: (τ, 〈b, j, l2 r〉) ≺
(τ ′, 〈b′, j′, l′ 2 r′〉) iff either len(τ) < len(τ ′) or (len(τ) = len(τ ′) and b < b′) or
(len(τ) = len(τ ′) and b = b′ and i′ > i). Since: the ordering of complete paths
by length; the < relation on Booleans with false < true; and the > relation the
subset of natural numbers up to n (the length of the proof) are well-founded
orders, their lexicographic product ≺ is a well-founded order as well.
We proceed by well-founded induction on ≺. We consider an arbitrary pair
(τ, 〈b, j, l 2 r〉) ∈ comPaths × G such that τ ∈ comPaths(l).
Let s = τ(0), thus, s0 ∈ γ(l). Since 〈b, j, l 2 r〉 ∈ G then there is i such that
was eliminated at step i, that is, 〈b, j, l 2 r〉 ∈ Gi \Gi+1. We have four cases:
1. 〈b, j, l2 r〉 was eliminated by [Impl]: then, l v r, and τ |= l2 r holds trivially.
2. 〈b, j, l 2 r〉 was eliminated by [Split]: then, l v l1 ∨ l2 and there are formulas
{〈b, j + 1, l1 2 r〉, 〈b, j + 1, l2 2 r〉} ⊆ Gi+1 ⊆ G. From s0 ∈ γ(l), using
Assumption 1 we obtain s0 ∈ γ(l1) or s0 ∈ γ(l2). Assume s0 ∈ γ(l1) - the
other case is symmetrical. Then, the pair (τ, 〈b, j+ 1, l1 2 r〉) ∈ comPaths×G
satisfies τ ∈ comPaths(l1), and by definition of≺ we have (τ, 〈b, j+1, l12r〉) ≺
(τ, 〈b, j, l 2 r〉). Using the induction hypothesis, τ |= l1 2 r, i.e., τ(k) ∈ γ(r)
for some k, which implies τ |= l 2 r and proves this case.
3. 〈b, j, l2 r〉 was eliminated by [Step]: we first show (†): s0 is not terminal. For,
assuming the contrary, s0 ∈ γ(l) ∩ γ(f) = γ(l ∧ f) (by Asssumption 1) and
therefore l ∧ f 6v ⊥, in contradiction with l ∧ f v ⊥ required for applying
[Step]. We thus have τ = s0 → s1 → · · · and
#→(l) v l′ with the added
formula 〈true, j + 1, l′ 2 r〉 ∈ Gi+1 ⊆ G. From s0 → s1 we obtain using
Lemma 6 that s1 ∈ γ(
#→(l)). Using Assumption 1 this implies s1 ∈ γ(l′), thus,
τ |1.. ∈ comPaths(l′). Thus, τ |1.. ∈ comPaths(l′), and by definition of ≺, we
have (τ |1.., 〈true, j + 1, l′ 2 r〉) ≺ (τ, 〈b, j, l2 r〉) and we obtain τ |1.. |= l′ 2 r;
thus τ(k) |= r for some k ≥ 1 . Hence, τ |= l 2 r, which proves this case.
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4. 〈b, j, l 2 r〉 was eliminated by [Circ]: then, b = true and l v l′, for some
〈false, 0, l′ 2 r′〉 ∈ G, and then 〈true, j + 1, l′′ 2 r〉 ∈ Gi+1 ⊆ G, with r′ v l′′.
From s0 ∈ γ(l) we obtain s0 ∈ γ(l′). Thus, τ ∈ comPaths(l′), and then
(τ, 〈false, 0, l′ 2 r′〉) ≺ (τ, 〈true, j, l 2 r〉) by the definition of ≺, which by
induction implies τ |= l′ 2 r′. Thus, τ(k) ∈ γ(r′) for some k ≥ 0.
If k = 0 then from τ(k) ∈ γ(r′) ⊆ γ(l′′) we get τ ∈ comPaths(l′′) and then
(τ, 〈true, j + 1, l′′ 2 r〉) ≺ (τ, 〈true, j, l 2 r〉) by the definition of ≺, which
implies τ |= l′′ 2 r i.e. there is k′ ≥ 0 such that τ(k′) ∈ γ(r), i.e., τ |= l 2 r.
Otherwise, k ≥ 1 with τ(k) ∈ γ(r′) and, again, since r′ v l′′, τ(k) ∈ γ(l′′).
Thus, τ |k.. ∈ comPaths(l′′), and (τ |k.., 〈true, j + 1, l′′ 2 r〉) ∈ comPaths × G
is in the ≺ relation with (τ, 〈true, j, l 2 r〉), thus, τ |k.. |= l′′ 2 r, i.e. there is
k′ ≥ k such that τ(k′) ∈ γ(r), which again implies τ |= l 2 r.
Thus, for all the possible ways in which 〈b, j, l2 r〉 ∈ G can be eliminated during
the proof, it holds that for any τ ∈ comPaths(l), τ |= l2 r. The lemma is proved.
Lemma 2 For all q, q′ ∈ S# with q v q′, #→(q) v #→(q′) holds.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary state s′ ∈ γ( #→(q)). By Assumption 2 there exists a
concrete state s ∈ γ(q) with s→ s′. Since q v q′ we also obtain s ∈ γ(q′). Thus,
using the fact that the abstract transition function simulates concrete transitions
we obtain s′ ∈ γ( #→(q′)). Thus, γ( #→(q)) ⊆ γ( #→(q′)), i.e., #→(q) v #→(q′).
Lemma 4 If |= l2 r and l∧ r v ⊥, coReach+f (r) 2 r is a terminator for l2 r.
Proof. We have to show the following:
– coReach+f (r) ∧ f v ⊥, i.e., γ(coReach
+
f (r) ∧ f) = ∅, which by Assumption 1
amounts to γ(coReach+f (r)) ∩ γ(f) = ∅, i.e., γ(coReach
+
f (r)) contains no
terminal states, which is ensured by Assumption 3 (i.e., if γ(coReach+f (r))
contained a terminal state s then any τ ∈ comPaths(s) would be of length 0,
contradicting the requirement (∃k)1 ≤ k ≤ len(τ) such that τ(k) ∈ γ(r)).
–
#→(coReach+f (r)) v coReach
+
f (r) ∨ r: using Assumption 1 this amounts to
γ(
#→(coReach+f (r)) ⊆ γ(coReach
+
f (r)) ∪ γ(r). We choose an arbitrary s ∈
γ(
#→(coReach+f (r)). Using Assumptions 1 and 2, there is s′ ∈ γ(coReach
+
f (r))
with s′ → s. Consider thus any path τ starting in s and leading to a state in
γ(f). The path τ ′ starting in s′ ∈ γ(coReach+f (r)) obtained by prefixing τ
with the transition s′ → s also leads to (the same state in) γ(f). This means
that τ ′ encounters a state in γ(r), i.e. there is k′ ∈ {1 . . . len(τ ′)} such that
τ ′(k′) ∈ γ(r). If k′ = 1 then τ ′(k′) = τ ′(1) = s ∈ γ(r). Otherwise, k′ > 1, and
τ has the state τ(k′ − 1) = τ ′(k′) ∈ γ(r) with k′ − 1 ∈ {1 . . . len(τ))}. Thus,
in this case, the arbitrarily chosen path path τ starting in s and leading to
a state in γ(f) has a state τ(k) ∈ γ(r) for k , k′ − 1 ∈ {1 . . . len(τ))}, i.e.,
s ∈ γ(coReach+f (r)). Overall, s ∈ γ(coReach
+
f (r)) ∪ γ(r): this case is proved.
– l v coReach+f (r), i.e., γ(l) ⊆ γ(coReach
+
f (r)). Let s ∈ γ(l). From |= l 2 r
we obtain that any path τ starting in s and leading to γ(f) encounters
γ(r). Since l ∧ r v ⊥, the position at which the path encounters γ(r) is in
1 · · · len(τ), i.e., s ∈ coReach+f (r), which proves this case and the lemma.
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